Friday, July 23, 2010

Philosophical Determinism

An excellent response to an essay on the Logical Argument For Determinism and Against Free Will on The NYT Philosophy Blog: 

That this argument fails to convince anyone that his choice is absolutely determined feels just like the Anselm argument failing to really convince anyone that God exists. It is always interesting that logic, however strong and well structured, doesn't really have much power to convince. There is pretty good evidence that our physical selves are pretty well deterministic, but we never believe it.

One reason, I think, is that our conscious mind may be just a passenger, watching what happens, but not really in control of anything. This conclusion is verified by scientific studies which show the patterns of mental activity about some action actually come very slightly after the body's action has been taken. Our body's actions are, in fact, pretty much determined. But, if our "mind" is a passenger, then it can't know what will happen and is always both surprised, so to speak, and filled with responsibility ( because it doesn't know that it is just a passenger).   
     - mitch diamond

The illusion of responsibility - even if it is indeed only an illusion - does seem to make evolutionary sense. If mental states are factors in future behavior the memory of past guilt is a helpful force in future decisions.  Even if we philosophers are baffled by the circular arguments presented to us by our senses, and surprised by the logical conclusions that result  (the absence of free will), at least we can marvel at our quirky existence  (the illusion of free will and feelings of responsibility)

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